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Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The
Elusive Uniform Standard of Reasonable Care
R.H. Helmholz*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Two assertions about the law of bailments seem to command
general assent. The first is that bailments are best defined simply
as the rightful possession of a chattel by one who is not also the
owner.' Describing bailments as inherently contractual in nature
or thinking of them as based upon a duty to preserve and redeliver
the goods in an undamaged state today appears to be a relic of
the long distant past, when the obligations of a bailee were once
absolute. The simpler, property-based definition of bailments is
the most accurate. The second assertion is that the liability of
bailees for loss or damage to the goods in their possession is
properly measured by a standard of ordinary care. 2 The use of
divergent theories of liability and varying degrees of negligence
that once complicated and disfigured the law of bailments has
today been superseded by a uniform negligence standard.' At least

R.lj. Helmholz, Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
The author would like to acknowledge the kind and helpful comments on an earlier version
of this article by Professor Stephen G. Gilles.
I. The most influential expression of this view is found in William K. Laidlaw,
Principles of Bailment, 16 CORNELL L.Q. 286, 287 (1931) ("Although it is frequently said
that bailment is founded upon contract, the actual decisions show that it is not so
founded."). See also F.H. LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN,

THE LAW OF PROPERTY 81-82,

96-97 (2d ed. 1982); Alice Erh-Soon Tay, The Essence of a Bailment: Contract, Agreement
or Possession?, 5 SYDNEY L. REV. 239 (1966).
2. See Kurt Philip Antor, Note, Bailment Liability: Toward a Standard of Reasonable
Care, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2117, 2125-27 (1988) [hereinafter Bailment Liability); see also
Peter N. Cubita, Recent Development, Proof of Delivery and Unexplained Failure of
Warehouse to Return Stored Property Upon Demand Held to Establish Prima Facie Case
of Conversion, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 203, 203 n.163 (1980) ("[I]t is well settled that the
liability of a bailee now is grounded in negligence.").
3. The fundamental article remains Sheldon D. Elliott, Degrees of Negligence, 6 S.
CAL. L. REv. 91 (1933). The present article does not deal with the questions dealt with in
Elliott's article: the rationale, the faults, and the persistence of the three-tier test. The
three-tier test varies the applicable degree of negligence according to the party who stands
to benefit from the bailment. The law on this question is brought up to date and discussed
in Bailment Liability, supra note 2.
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to judge from the presentation found in the hornbooks 4 and
casebooks5 used in American law schools, the old controversy
about the underlying nature of the bailee's responsibility in caring
for the goods of the bailor is now primarily a matter of historical
interest.
Samuel Williston gave the classic formulation to this propertybased understanding of bailments. 6 Although he recognized that

bailments were in fact often based upon agreement, Williston
maintained that only an analysis that regarded lawful possession

as the one essential element of a bailment could encompass involuntary, gratuitous, and implied bailments. For example, it makes
little sense to think in contractual terms of the relationship between
a finder of lost goods and their owner. Any agreement between
them must be purely imaginary, and it requires a large leap of the
imagination to find any consideration in such a relationship. Yet
they are beyond doubt bailor and bailee. For Williston, as for
other commentators, it stretches common sense too far to regard
finder and owner as bound by the terms of an implied contract.
Rather, it is much better to define their mutual obligations as
based simply upon the rightful possession of goods by one who is
not the owner.
A second advantage of the property-based analysis is that it
better accords with defining the duty of care owed to bailors by
bailees in terms of ordinary negligence, whereas a contractual

4. See RAY A. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.1, at 210 (Walter B.
Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975) ("A great deal of this uncertainty and casuistry would have
been avoided had the broader definition of bailment been adopted at the beginning."); D.
BARLOW BUR.KE, JR., PERSONAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 134 (1983) (the law "would
probably be better served" by rejecting "the fiction of a constructive bailment" in favor
of the property based definition); JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 86 (3d ed. 1989) (essence of bailment is "the transfer of the
possession of personal property, without the transfer of ownership").
5.
JON W. BRUCE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 195 (2d
ed. 1989); A. JAMES CASNER & W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 39 (3d
ed. 1984); SHELDON F. KURTZ & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CASES AND MATERIALS ON AMERICAN
PROPERTY LAW 71-72 (1987); PATRICK J. RoHAN, REAL PROPERTY: PRACTICE AND PROCE-

DURE § 4.01 (1981). But cf. CHARLES DONAHUE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
PROPERTY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THM INsTrruTION 83 (2d ed. 1983)

(suggesting limitations inherent in Williston's definition of the standard of a bailee's
liability).
6. 9 SAMUEL S. WILLISTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1030, at 875
(Walter H. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1967); see also Zuppa v. Hertz Corp., 268 A.2d 364, 366
(Essex County Ct., N.J. 1970) ("It is the element of lawful possession, however created,
... that creates the bailment, regardless of whether such possession is based upon contract
in the ordinary sense or not."); 2 THOMAS A. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEoAL LIABILrrY

308 (1906).
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analysis of bailments better fits a system of strict liability. Although, logically, there may be no necessary connection between
the theory of bailment adopted and the standard of liability
applied, in fact the connection is often made in the case law, and
indeed it seems altogether appropriate. Strict liability is the normal
rule for cases involving breach of contract or deliberate wrong.
Negligence is the normal rule for cases involving accidental loss
or damage to the property of others - the usual situation in
bailment cases. It seems entirely sensible, therefore, at least in the
absence of particular and special circumstances, to connect the
property-based analysis of bailments with the uniform standard of
ordinary care.
It is true enough that most hornbooks and casebooks do mention
one exception to this uniform standard of liability - the case of
misdelivery. If the bailee delivers the bailed goods to the wrong
person, the law traditionally has imposed strict liability on the
bailee. This rule is still followed in many jurisdictions. 7 Today,
however, the misdelivery exception appears anomalous. Why should
bailees be liable only for negligence if the goods are destroyed or
damaged, but held to a standard of absolute liability when, through
no fault of their own, the goods wind up in the hands of someone
other than the owner?' It is hard to see any good reason. The
misdelivery exception now seems to represent merely an isolated
holdover from the older, but now discredited, view that treated
bailments as contractual in nature and consequently visited liability
without fault upon the bailee. 9 Aside from this one exception, the
accepted view holds that a uniform standard of ordinary care
prevails. Thus, ordinary negligence defines the liability of bailees.
This Article challenges this consensus as a statement of the law
as actually applied in modern American decisions. The Article's
conclusion is that the property-based conception of bailments and
the uniform standard of negligence that accompanies it have not
in fact triumphed in much of our decisional law. Contract and
conversion theories continue to play a larger role in the modern
law of bailments than textbooks suggest, and this role is important
in practice. The search for a uniform standard has not yet succeeded.

7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 234 (1965); BROWN, supra note 4, § 11.7.
8. See, e.g., Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 231 P. 445, 448 (Utah 1924) ("[Alt first
blush it may seem that in all cases where the bailee is deceived or tricked into delivering
the property he should be excused unless he was guilty of negligence in making the delivery.
Such, however, is not the law.").
9. See, e.g., KuRTz & HOVENKAMP, supra note 5, at 159.
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SCOPE OF Tins STUDY

There has been no systematic treatise devoted to the American
law of bailments in more than sixty years.' 0 Law review articles
devoted to the subject can be counted on the fingers of two
hands." The subject is distinctly out of fashion. However, even if
one makes full allowance for the lamentable decline in the publication of scholarship devoted to legal doctrine, it does seem strange

that this subject should be so wholly neglected. A sizeable number
of bailment cases continue to come before American courts, 2
including many in which a decision awarding recovery based upon
a bailment theory seems to have been "sprung" on one of the
parties. 3 It seems inherently unlikely that these cases should be
unworthy of comment or analysis. Moreover, the bailment continues to be a pervasive transaction in modern life.' 4 It is true that
statutes have been enacted to cover many aspects of modern
commercial life in which the common law of bailments once ruled

10.

(1914);

See

ARMISTEAD

WILLIAM

F.

M.

DOBIE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS

ELLIOTT, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (William

Hemingway ed., 2d ed. 1929); see also WILLIAM P. RICHARDSON, OUTLINE OF THE LAW OF
BAILMENTS, CARRIERS AND INNKEEPERS (1930); HUGH D. ScoTT, LAW OF BAILMENTS (1931)
(with special reference to Pennsylvania). The treatise EDWIN KASSOFF ET AL., SALES AND
BAMMENTS (1973) (published as part of the Pace Business Law Series) is too brief and
superficial to be counted. The English treatise tradition on the subject appears to be slightly
more robust. See NORMAN E. PALMER, BAILMENT (1979); G.W. PATON, BAILMENT IN THE

COMMON LAW (1952).
II. See supra notes 1-3; infra note 12.
12. See, e.g., Allen v. Hyatt Regency-Nashville Hotel, 668 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Tenn.
1984) (rejecting alternate approach adopted by New Jersey court, in favor of traditional
bailment analysis as "the most satisfactory and realistic approach to the problem" of

liability of owners of parking garages). This general point was first brought to my attention
by Roger A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor
Helmholz, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1986), an article which provided the impetus for my
curiosity about this subject. In some respects, the law of bailments actually covers more

of life's everyday transactions than it once did. See A. Darby Dickerson, Note, Bailor
Beware: Limitations and Exclusions of Liability in Commercial Bailments, 41 VAND. L.
REV. 129 (1988) [hereinafter Bailor Beware]; Note, Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing &
Rental Service, Products Liability: The Extension of Strict Liability to Non-Sale Transactions, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 144, 145 n.3 (1966).
13. See, e.g., Colgate Palmolive Co. v. S/S Dart Canada, 724 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1983)
(admiralty dispute assumedly governed by Carriage of Goods by Sea Act decided as a
bailment case); Arsbery v. State, 32 11. Ct. Cl. 127 (1978) (treating State as bailee of
articles in prisoner's cell when prisoners were evacuated after a prison riot rendered the
cellhouse uninhabitable); Merchants Leasing Co. v. Clark, 540 P.2d 922 (Wash. Ct. App.
1975) (lessor repossessing pressure cooker used in preparing chickens in tavern held to be
bailee and liable for conversion when he sold it).
14. See Bailment Liability, supra note 2, at 2121.
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unchallenged. 5 However, these statutes have by no means occupied
the field, and the statutes themselves are usually interpreted according to standards inherited from the common law of bailments. 16 Given the combination of scholarly neglect and the large
sums of money at stake in many of these cases, examination of
the modern case law relating to the liability of bailees appears to
be a doubly useful enterprise.
This Article grows out of such an examination. In Parts III
through VIII, the Article analyzes the following categories of
bailment cases: Cases involving (III) procedural rules, (IV) contractual terms and the duty to return bailed goods unharmed, (V)
deviations from contractual terms, (VI) conversion by bailees, (VII)
misdelivery by the bailee, and (VIII) limitations on the liability of
bailees. The Article's intent is (1) to test the validity of the
property-based view of bailments as a description of current law
as enforced in American courts; and (2) to explore the implications
of the evidence for describing and fixing the liability of bailees.
Its conclusions, therefore, do not necessarily challenge Williston's
analysis directly. His argument that not all bailments can be fitted
easily within a contractual framework is unanswerable. 17 Moreover,
the preference for a uniform standard of reasonable care in cases
of loss or damage is cogent and appealing. However, that cannot
be the end of the matter. Whether this view adequately describes
what happens in the ordinary run of bailment cases is a different
and important question, and it is the subject of this study.
This study is based on the author's examination of most of the
appellate decisions involving a bailee's liability to the bailor decided
by American courts since the last American treatise on the subject
appeared in 1929. Its conclusions depend on those cases in which
the judge found that it made a substantive difference whether one
theory or another was applied to the question of defining the
standard of a bailee's liability. In many of the cases uncovered by
the examination, perhaps the majority, the theory applied by the
judge made little difference in the outcome of the case. Plaintiffs
in these cases often pleaded one count in negligence and, alternatively, one count in breach of contract. 18 But either way the
results turned out to be the same.
However, stopping with these cases would leave a large number
of cases unaccounted for. In addition, it would give an inadequate
15. See 2 JsES WIrTE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 21-2,
at 135 (3d ed. 1988).
16. See id. § 21-3, at 147-48.
17. See WILLISTON, supra note 6, § 1030, at 876-77.
18. See infra pp. 10-13.
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account of the broad range of issues that have arisen in litigation.
An examination of the cases decided since 1929 shows that decisions analyzing bailments solely in possessory terms and discussing
liability as if it were based invariably upon a uniform standard of
ordinary care are seriously incomplete. They overemphasize the
degree to which the contractual and delictual elements have fallen
out of the modern law of bailments, and they minimize the variety
of ways in which bailees have been found liable to bailors. On
this account they may mislead. In fact, the exception for misdelivery is only one of the ways in which alternative theories of
liability remain crucial in the decisional law of bailments. Bailees
are frequently held to a higher standard of care, and this occurs
because courts apply standards drawn from the law of contracts
and conversion.
III.

PROCEDURAL RULES

I begin with an area where some real progress has been made
in harmonizing the treatment of bailment problems - allocating
the burden of proof. 9 This area provides a benchmark against
which the continuing lack of uniformity in other areas of the law
can be measured. The theoretical difference between contract-based
and property-based analyses here is simple and dramatic. If a
negligence standard is applied in cases where the goods have been
lost or damaged, it will be incumbent upon the bailor to prove
that the bailee's lack of ordinary care has caused the loss. The
party alleging negligence, the bailor, must accept the burden of
proof. Of course, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may come to
the aid of bailors in appropriate circumstances, 20 but the risk of
nonpersuasion nonetheless remains on them. 2' If, on the other
hand, the bailment is defined as a contract requiring redelivery of
the item bailed, then quite a different result is reached. Like any
promisor, bailees who fail to live up to their contractual obligation
become prima facie liable for breach of contract. To escape
liability, bailees must plead and prove an adequate excuse - force
majeure for example. The ultimate risk of nonpersuasion, then,
rests squarely on the bailees.

19. See generally Robert M. Sweet, Burden of Proof of Bailee's Negligence in Connection with His Failure to Redeliver, 8 HASTINGs L.J. 89 (1956) (discussing the impact of
burden of proof allocation on cases involving bailee's failure to redeliver bailed goods).
20. See, e.g., Royster v. Pittman, 691 S.W.2d 305, 308 (Mo. App. 1985) (unexplained
appearance of scratches, gouging, and breakage among antique furniture left with bailee
raised inference of negligence under res ipsa loquitur doctrine).
21. Id.
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Were these theories rigidly applied in practice, bailors would
proceed on a contract theory whenever the burden of proof issue
presented an obstacle to recovery. The search for a fair standard
of reasonable care would be lost in consequence. However, this
has not happened. The very starkness of this theoretical dilemma
has prompted American courts to move towards a more uniform
treatment in dealing with questions of allocating the burden of
proof. In the last sixty years, courts have often struggled with
what Justice Traynor once described as "conflicting and confusing" precedents.22 Today, however, most jurisdictions have reached
a realistic solution. Under the rule adopted in these jurisdictions,
if the bailor proves the bailee's failure to return the goods in the
appropriate condition, the burden of going forward with evidence
to explain the loss or damage falls upon the bailee.23 If the bailee
fails to explain how the disappearance or damage occurred, then
judgment will be for the bailor3u If the bailee does produce such
evidence, however, the ultimate burden of proof will return to the
bailor. 25 The bailor will bear the burden of showing that the loss
occurred through the bailee's negligence, and the bailee will be
entitled to a jury instruction to that effect. 26 For example, if the
bailee comes forward with evidence showing that the goods were
destroyed by a fire, the bailor will bear the burden of showing
that the fire was started by the negligence of the bailee. 27 If the
bailor produces no evidence showing that the bailee was at fault,
then the bailor is out of court.2 Under this formulation of the
law, it makes no difference whether the bailor brings the action
ex contractu or ex delicto. The result is the same.
A few American jurisdictions have adopted the exact opposite
rule, holding that both the burden of producing evidence and the

22. George v. Bekins Van & Storage Co., 205 P.2d 1037, 1041 (Cal. 1949).
23. See Hearst Magazines v. Cuneo E. Press, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (E.D. Pa.
1969); Lewis v. Ebersole, 12 So. 2d 543, 546 (Ala. 1943); Scott v. Purser Truck Sales,
Inc., 402 S.E.2d 354, 356 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991); Sampson v. Birkeland, 211 N.E.2d 139,
140-41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965); Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Griswold & Bateman Warehouse
Co., 458 A.2d 1341, 1343 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); National Fire Ins. Co. v.
Mogan, 206 P.2d 963, 966 (Or. 1949); Moss v. Bailey Sales & Serv., Inc., 123 A.2d 425,
426-27 (Pa. 1956); Astronauts Warehouses, Inc., v. Adams Sales Co., Inc., 508 S.W.2d
171, 174 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Revenue Aero Club, Inc. v. Alexandria Airport, Inc., 64
S.E.2d 671, 674 (Va. 1951); Chaloupka v. Cyr, 387 P.2d 740, 742 (Wash. 1963).
24. See, e.g., Scott, 402 S.E.2d at 356.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Lewis, 12 So. 2d at 547.
28. See id.
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ultimate burden of proving due care rest with the bailee.2 9 This
result is justified by the supposition that bailees enjoy superior
access to knowledge about the loss, the assumption that bailees
will exercise greater care if the burden is placed upon them, and
the argument that bailees have greater ability to secure insurance
so as to spread the loss. a0 Whether this minority rule is preferable
to the majority view is certainly open to question. 3 However, the
crucial point is that the courts in states that adopt the minority
rule now reach the same result whether the action is framed in
contract or in tort. The allocation of the burden of going forward
with the evidence and the ultimate burden of proof remain the
same no matter which theory of bailment is adopted.
These alternative solutions to the theoretical dilemma, endorsed
by courts and by most commentators, have come to dominate the
case law. There do continue to be exceptional decisions in which
a contract theory is used to hold that the bailee is under a duty
to prove the exercise of due care on his part, whereas the opposite
result might have been reached had the suit been framed in terms
of simple possession.32 However, these cases now represent a truly

29. Downey v. Martin Aircraft Serv., Inc., 214 P.2d 581, 584-85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950);
Low v. Park Price Co., 503 P.2d 291, 294 (Idaho 1972); Wallinga v. Johnson, 131 N.W.2d
216 (Minn. 1964); Fortner v. Carnes, 189 S.E.2d 24, 26-27 (S.C. 1972). This tendency is
discussed approvingly in Sweet, supra note 19, at 95.
30. See, e.g., Low, 503 P.2d at 294-96.
31. In 1971 the State of Florida adopted one rule for losses below $10,000 and another
for losses greater than $10,000, shifting the burden from bailee to bailor in the latter case.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 677.403(1)(b) (West Supp. 1991). The statute was upheld against
constitutional challenge in Reserve Ins. Co. v. Gulf Fla. Terminal Co., 386 So. 2d 550,
552 (Fla. 1980).
32. E.g., C.V. Sohn, Inc. v. J.W. Milligan, Inc., 741 S.W.2d 60, 63 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987) ("[T]he bailee must prove exercise of due care on its part."); Ryan v. Park-Rite
Corp., 573 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("In a bailment action which is based
on breach of a bailment contract, . . . [w]hen [failure to redeliver] has been shown, the
burden then rests upon the bailee to prove its exercise of ordinary care."); Broadview
Leasing Co. v. Cape Cent. Airways, Inc., 539 S.W.2d 553, 561 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
("[Wihere the theory of the bailor's action is based on breach of contract, the burden of
proof lies with the bailee to plead and prove due care on its part."); Gutknecht v. Wagner
Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 266 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954) (criticizing the
"failure ... to distinguish between an action based on the negligence of the warehouseman
and an action founded upon the contract of bailment"); see also Metropolitan Vacuum
Cleaner Co. v. Douglas-Guardian Warehouse Corp., 208 F. Supp. 195, 196 (S.D.N.Y.
1962) ("Defendant did, however, have the duty to comply with its contract of bailment,
and its failure to do so renders it liable to answer for conversion."); A.A.A. Parking, Inc.
v. Bigger, 149 S.E.2d 255, 258 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (action available in contract, although
one would not lie in tort, where the plaintiff's car had been stolen and the statement of
claim "charged only a failure to continue performance of defendant's duties under a
bailment contract, or nonfeasance"); Weinberg v. D-M Restaurant Corp., 426 N.E.2d 459,

1992]

BAILMENT THEORIES

small part of appellate litigation, and it is often unclear under the
facts of these cases whether the result would have actually been
different had one or the other theory of bailment been rigorously
applied. The most that can be said is that some decisions have
seemed to conclude that it made a difference whether the complaint
was framed in tort or in contract. But the more salient fact is
how few such decisions there have been.
This progress, however, has not resulted in the entire absence
of difficulty. The most difficult cases dealing with the allocation
of the burden of proof have been those in which neither the bailee
nor the bailor could explain how the loss occurred. 3 These cases
offer a test of the question and are deserving of treatment on that
account. Even here, the cases demonstrate that some progress
towards uniformity has taken place. In many of the cases, neither
party knew what had happened, and by the time of trial there was
simply no way to discover the actual cause of the loss. 3 4 Sometimes
bailees in such cases could allege a plausible reason for the loss
to the goods, but only in the most general terms. Bailees may
allege for instance that, all things considered, the goods "must
have been stolen."" In these situations, bailees have relied on a
general showing that they had adopted adequate safety procedures
to prevent loss or harm, arguing that the bailor should bear
the
6
burden of showing some inadequacy in those procedures.
In such cases of uncertainty, which side prevails? The outcome
inevitably turns on the procedural question of which party bears
the burden of proof, and it is not altogether obvious where the
burden should lie. A common example is when a bank's regular
customer alleges that its employee left a bag containing money in
the bank's night deposit box, but the bag is never found.3 7 At

463 (N.Y. 1981) (recovery for conversion precluded by fact that plaintiff pleaded only
negligence in loss of fur coat checked in restaurant cloakroom); David v. Lose, 218 N.E.2d
442, 445 (Ohio 1966) ("The Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the question is not
whether the plaintiff has established negligence but whether the defendants have established
a legal excuse for breach of the contract.").
33. See Richard F. Broude, The Emerging Pattern of Field Warehouse Litigation:
Liability for Unexplained Losses and Nonexistent Goods, 47 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1968)
(discussing allocation of burden of proof when unexplained warehouse shortages occur).
34. E.g., Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp.,
213 N.E.2d 873, 875-76 (N.Y. 1965).
35. Id. at 876.
36. Broude, supra note 33, at 21-26.
37. E.g., Vilner v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 152 Cal. Rptr. 850 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979);
Employers Ins. v. Chemical Bank, 459 N.Y.S.2d 238 (Civ. Ct. 1983); Bernstein v. Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 41 A.2d 440 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945). The major (and continuing) dispute
over such deposits has been over the validity of exoneration clauses commonly inserted in
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trial, no one. can account for the loss. The bank will aver that it
operated a secure system, and the customer will aver that the
employee had made the deposit in accordance with its normal
practice. But that is all that either side will be able to show. These
facts will be treated as creating a bailment by most American
courts, and the question of liability will normally be determined
by deciding which side bears the ultimate burden of proof.
In dealing with such cases, treating the bailment as a contract
offers a tempting way out of the dilemma. It can be argued that
since the bailee has neither fulfilled the contractual obligation to
redeliver the goods nor proffered a provable explanation for that
failure, liability necessarily follows as a matter of law. A few
courts have seized upon this possibility. As one Ohio court saw
it, "[T]he duty to redeliver is not based on negligence and is
excused only if there has been a loss without fault or want of care
on the bailee's part." 3 The bailee bears the burden of showing its
due care. If there is "no evidence to how or when the loss occurred,
and [the] court is left to speculate on that matter," the bailor will
be entitled to judgment due to the bailee's default on a contractual
obligation.3 9
It is a measure of the progress made in this area of the law
that, during recent years, only a few American courts have relied
upon this distinction between contract and tort theories in such
difficult bailment cases. When the loss cannot be specifically
accounted for, most courts have placed the risk of nonpersuasion
on the bailee, but have framed the decision in terms of a presumption of negligence. In other words, they have not based their
decision on a contractual analysis of the bailment, but on their
understanding of the proper reach of the law of proof. One New
York court summed up the feeling underlying the result by stating

deposit agreements. Compare Hy-Grade Oil Co. v. New Jersey Bank, 350 A.2d 279 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975) (refusing to enforce clause) with Valley Nat'l Bank v. Tang,
499 P.2d 991 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (enforcing clause). See generally G.O. Dykstra, The
User of a Bank's Night Depository Facilities, 70 BANKINo L.J. 121 (1953).
38. Kayanda v. Kamenir, 475 N.E.2d 519, 521 (Akron, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1984).
39. Id. at 522; see also Gebert v. Yank, 218 Cal. Rptr. 585, 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)
(allowing verdict against bailee for breach of bailment contract to care for horses although
jury had found against bailor on the issue of negligence); Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co.
v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 213 N.E.2d 873, 881 (N.Y. 1965) (citing with
approval the lower court's assertion that it is "self-contradictory for a warehouseman
simultaneously to assert due care and total lack of knowledge of what happened"); Phillips
Home Furnishings Inc. v. Continental Bank, 331 A.2d 840, 845 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 354 A.2d 542 (Pa. 1976) (action brought for breach of contract
to safeguard funds left in night depository safe, but without alleging negligence, leaves
only issue of creation of bailment for decision by jury where funds could not be found).
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that "[t]he total ignorance of the bailees instead of being an excuse
is the measure of their fault.'"'4 Bailees cannot overcome the
presumption of negligence unless they can show what actually
happened. Pleading ignorance of the circumstances may exacerbate
their blameworthiness. 4' Even in this difficult class of cases, therefore, today the same result is reached regardless of the bailment
theory being applied. Procedural rules are used to allocate the
burden of showing negligence according to a rational decision
about which side should bear that burden, not according to whether
the action has been defined in terms of negligence, contract, or
conversion.
Unfortunately, the same advances have not occurred with respect
to all procedural questions, although, during the past sixty years,
other procedural issues have arisen in appellate litigation with
much less frequency. 42 Bailment cases dealing with statutes of
limitation provide one illustration. In this area of the law, the
contractual concept of a bailment continues to lead a vigorous
life, resulting in occasional confusion and unpredictability. The
problem is caused by the widespread existence of two different
statutes of limitation, one for actions in contract and another for
actions in tort. Normally, the statute of limitations applied to
actions brought in contract is of a longer duration than that
applied to actions brought in tort. Accordingly, it will be in the
interests of bailors to invoke the former. Can they do so? If they
can, an obstacle will have been created for adoption of a uniform
standard of reasonable care.
There have not been many cases on this subject, 43 but recent
cases suggest that a choice of theory may still be available to

40. National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 255
N.Y.S.2d 788, 800 (N.Y. App. Div.), rev'd on other grounds sub noma., Procter & Gamble
Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 213 N.E.2d 873 (N.Y. 1965).
41. See, e.g., id.; see also Tremaroli v. Delta Airlines, 458 N.Y.S.2d 159, 161 (Queens
County Civ. Ct. 1983) (airport security guards bound to take "all necessary measures to
safeguard" baggage put through security check, apparently endorsing strict liability for
presumed negligence in loss of hand baggage); Armbruster Mfg. Co. v. State, 36 Ill.
Ct.
Cl. 192, 193-94 (1984) (ignorance of the term of a lease agreement does not satisfy bailee's
burden to prove that its agents exercised due care).
42. Some of the other essentially procedural questions in which the outcome may
depend on whether the matter is analyzed in terms of contract or tort include the proper
measure of damages, availability of punitive damages, survival of the cause of action, and
proper choice of law. See generally Wn.LIu L. PROSSER, SELECTED TOPIcS ON THE LAW
OF TORTS

422-52 (1954).

43. The most common problem in applying statutes of limitation has been the question
of determining when the cause of action accrued because many bailments do not set a
specific termination date. In such circumstances it is generally held that the statute begins
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bailors, at least when the bailed items have disappeared or have
been destroyed. One example is Baratta v. Kozlowski, 44 a New
York case in which the plaintiff brought an action against a bailee
for conversion of bonds owned by the plaintiff. The Appellate
Division applied the six-year contractual statute of limitations,
rather than the three-year statute ordinarily used for tort claims. 45
The judge found that this claim "had its genesis in the contractual
relationship of the parties," 46 frankly admitting that he was allowing bailors to "select a remedy less likely to be frustrated by time
restrictions." ' 47 The same result has been reached in other jurisdictions,48 though not always with the same candor about the advantage being accorded to bailors. On the other hand, there are also
cases in which it has been held that the tort statute of limitations
must always be applied in such actions.49 As is evident, harmony
has not been achieved. It is little wonder that a trial lawyer's
practice manual includes a section entitled "Selecting a Favorable
Statute" that furnishes pointers for bailment cases.50
In sum, an examination of the treatment of procedural questions
in bailment cases over the past sixty years shows that uncertainties
remain. On some questions, liability may turn on how the pleading

to run from the time the bailor demanded return of the chattel, not from the time of its
loss or damage. See, e.g., Wood v. Garner, 274 S.E.2d 737, 738 (Ga. App. 1980); Heede
Hoist & Mach. Co. v. Bayview Towers Apartments, Inc., 424 N.Y.S.2d 517, 517 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1980); Industrial Welding Supplies, Inc. v. Atlas Vending Co., 251 S.E.2d 741,
742 (S.C. 1979).
44. 464 N.Y.S.2d 803 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
45. Id. at 809.
46. Id. (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assocs., 372 N.E.2d 555, 558 (N.Y.
1977).
47. 464 N.Y.S.2d at 809.
48. Andersen v. Thude, 25 P.2d 272, 273 (Ariz. 1933); Continental Ins. Co. v. Windle
Ford Co., 520 P.2d 1235, 1238 (Kan. 1974); Simmons v. Yelverton, 513 So. 2d 504, 508
(La. Ct. App. 1987); Klein v. Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc., 250 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1964); Mills v. Liberty Moving & Storage, Inc., 503 N.E.2d 199, 202 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1985); cf. Ward v. System Auto Parts & Garages, Inc., 309 P.2d 577, 578 (Cal. App.
Dep't. Super. Ct. 1957) (contractual analysis used to oust negligence statute of limitations
restricting bailor's ability to bring suit).
49. Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Peerless Storage Co., 404 F. Supp. 492, 496 (S.D. Ohio
1975), aff'd, 561 F.2d 20, 24 (6th Cir. 1977); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 587 F. Supp. 466, 468 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (holding that action was in contract
and not barred by the one-year statute of limitations), rev'd, 762 F.2d 1021 (l1th Cir.
1985); Starns v. Emmons, 524 So. 2d 251, 253 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding action to be
in contract and applying the statute of limitations for actions in contract), rev'd, 538 So.
2d 275, 277 (La. 1989) (holding that the shorter, liberative statute of limitations applied,
notwithstanding that one count was brought for breach of contract).
50. Arvo Van Alstyne, Tactics and Strategy of Pleading, 3 Am. JUR. TRIALS 681, 769
(1965).
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is framed and on which theory of bailment is invoked. However,
in dealing with the most frequently contested question - allocating
the burden of proof - the search for a uniform standard that
focuses realistically on establishing which party was most likely at
fault has been largely successful. Today, few American jurisdictions
render a decision dependent upon the theory of bailment employed.
There is now a majority and a minority rule on the question of
upon whom the ultimate burden of proof lies. Most states put the
burden of proving negligence on the bailor and require the bailee
to bear only the initial burden of producing evidence of how the
loss occurred. A sizeable minority places the ultimate burden on
the bailee in every instance. However, within any particular jurisdiction the rule is uniform. The courts treat all bailment cases
alike. That is progress.
IV.

CONTRACTUAL TERMS AND THE DUTY TO RETURN BAILED

GOODS UNHARMED

The search for a uniform standard of liability based upon fault
has not fared as well in other areas of bailment law. Conspicuous
among the failures are the cases in which the bailor asserts that,
by the terms of the bailment itself, the bailee had assumed a
formal duty to return the bailed items unharmed, rendering the
question of negligence legally irrelevant. In these circumstances,
when the goods have been damaged or lost without fault on the
part of the bailee, the cases decided since 1929 have not been
harmonious. Unlike the situation in the recent case law relating to
the burden of proof, too often the outcome of disputes seems to
have been determined by whether the court chose to focus its
attention on the bailment as inherently contract based or inherently
property based.
Under any regime, bailors and bailees are of course free to vary
the tt rms of the bailee's liability by contract. 5 ' Bailees may become
insurers of the property in their possession by special agreement,
and there will always be circumstances in which it is quite appropriate for them to take on that additional burden. The real
difficulties have lain in deciding whether a bailee has in fact done
so. In such cases, bailment theory has made a real difference. The
theory adopted has fixed the allocation of liability. The root cause
of the difficulties is that bailees often do not fully think through
the range of possibilities of loss that exist. They do not contemplate
the unexpected, and this natural lack of foresight may cause

51.

See BROWN, supra note 4, § 11.5, at 274.
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ambiguity as to whether they have in fact intended to assume an
absolute responsibility to return the goods unharmed. Bailors will
argue that the bailees have assumed an absolute responsibility;
bailees will argue that they have not. The result will turn on the
interpretation of contractual language that was not at all designed
to cover the loss that actually occurred. Too often the cases show
that the final result frustrates all attempts to secure a uniform
standard of negligence-based liability.
The ordinary rule gives only a hint of the trouble in this area.
It is hornbook law that a promise to return the goods will not of
itself establish responsibility when the goods cannot be returned
because they have been destroyed or lost.5 2 Such a promise is
usually held to mean only that the bailee agreed to fulfill the
bailee's ordinary duty to return the chattel at the end of the
bailment. No responsibility for theft or purely accidental loss
attaches to the bailee. However, where there exists only slightly
more than an agreement to return the chattel - for instance, a
promise to return the chattels in good order, to give them back
in the same condition as received, or even to return them or pay
their price - then American courts are divided. Some have stuck
with a property-based understanding of bailments. Others, however, have not. They have pointedly determined that "it is [the
bailee's] contract which must measure the extent of his liability," 53
and, if there has been damage, this contractual undertaking results
in liability without fault.
An unexceptional Arkansas case illustrates both the pattern and
the problem underlying a bailee's promise to redeliver the bailor's
goods in a specified condition . 4 The defendant in the case leased
a truck, agreeing in one of the lease's several provisions "to
surrender the same at the expiration of the term of this lease in
good condition."" The truck was damaged in a collision for which
the defendant was in no way at fault, and he returned it in its
damaged state. In the suit by the truck's owner, the Arkansas
court held that the quoted contractual provision rendered the lessee
liable without any showing of negligence on his part.16 The court
admitted that the lessee, as a bailee, would not otherwise be liable
for the loss, and it acknowledged the existence of contrary au-

52.

See 8 AM. JuR. 2D Bailments § 152, at 882 (1980).

53.

Allemania Fire Ins. Co. v. Keller Diamond Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 9,.12 (N.Y. Sup.

Ct. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 104 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1951).
54. Miller v. Dyer, 423 S.W.2d 275 (Ark. 1968).
55. Id. at 276.
56. Id. at 278.
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thority.5 7 Nevertheless, the judge reasoned that any other result
would render the contractual language mere "surplusage" and
would thereby give the bailment contract a "construction which
entirely neutralizes one provision." 58 Because the bailment was in
essence a contract, the judge held that a separate and distinct
meaning had to be given to each of its terms.
The artificiality of the court's holding is apparent. Under the
court's analysis, the result will vary dramatically depending on
slight variations in wording. The distinction between language
agreeing simply to return a specific item and language agreeing to
return it in the condition in which it had originally been received
by the bailee will often be tenuous, thereby inviting anomalous
results. Moreover, the distinction imputes an intent to bailees that
very often exceeds their reasonable understanding at the time of
entering into the bailment. Most people who agree to return
property in good condition mean that they will take good care of
it. They do not mean to become insurers of its continued existence.
For example, the person who borrows a horse and promises to
give it back in good condition means to guarantee that the horse
will be well treated, not that it will not be allowed to die of
natural causes. 9 The borrower of an automobile who promises to
teturn it in the same condition as it was received means to
guarantee that it will be kept in good repair, not that the automobile will never be stolen. 60 None of these bailees intends to
become an insurer. Nevertheless, this is the result that emphasizing
the contractual side of bailments allows - a result that has been
reached in a great many of cases decided since 1929.
Courts begin with what one judge described as a "careful reading
of the provisions of the contract.''61 They then proceed to hold
that the existence of any contractual language implying a responsibility to do more than simply return the item effectively makes
the bailee an insurer. 62 As a Nebraska court stated in a case where
the bailee had agreed to return an automobile "in substantially
the same condition" as it had been received, "[t]he question here

57. Id. at 277-78.
58. Id. at 278.
59. See Grady v. Schweinler, 113 N.W. 1031 (N.D. 1907).
60. See Perreault v. Circle Club, Inc., 95 N.E.2d 204, 205-06 (Mass. 1950) (recovery
allowed on the basis of a promise to return in as good order as when received despite
existence of "weight of authority" to the contrary in the case law).
61. Great Plains Supply Co. v. Mobil Oil Co., 172 N.W.2d 241, 249 (N.D. 1969); see
also Max Biederman, Inc. v. Henderson, 176 S.E. 433, 434 (W. Va. 1934) ("[The plaintiff
stands upon a hard bargain, but the defendant does not deny the terms of the contract.").
62. 172 N.W.2d at 249.
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is not that of defendant's exercise of due care, [but] ... of
defendant's liability for a breach of its admitted contract.''63
In such cases, it will not necessarily matter that the original
promise had been equivocal or that the original promise was purely
oral. In a recent Indiana case, for instance, the evidence showed
that the bailee of a truck had done nothing more elaborate than
to say, "he would bring it back, just like, you know, just like he
got it." The truck was later stolen from the bailee's possession,
and the court held that he was liable without any showing of
negligence on his part. "To rule otherwise," the Indiana judge
announced, "would strain the law of contracts." 65 The fact that
his decision strained the uniform standard of negligence-based
liability well beyond the breaking point did not appear to trouble
him. Nevertheless, many of his colleagues on the bench have felt
the same way."
It is quite true that some of the relevant cases decided since
1929 have held the opposite - that bailees assume no added
burden by agreeing to return the item in the same condition as
received. 67 Most of the sparse commentary on the subject approves
of these cases, sometimes treating them as stating the dominant
rule. 6 But the truth is that there is no dominant rule. Indeed, it
is
to see how, in6 9the present state of things, there can
everdifficult
be a dominant
rule. Since the question must always be
whether or not a particular bailee has in fact agreed to assume a
greater burden than that of reasonable care, each case must be

63. Bozell & Jacobs, Inc. v. Blackstone Terminal Garage, Inc., 75 N.W.2d 366, 371
(Neb. 1956).
64. Spencer v. Glover, 412 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
65. Id. at 874.
66. Other cases of recovery based on similar oral undertakings: Industron Corp. v.
Waltham Door & Window Co., 190 N.E.2d 211 (Mass. 1963); Thummel v. Krewson, 764
S.W.2d 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); Bozell & Jacobs, Inc., 75 N.W.2d at 366.
67. See, e.g., Barret v. Ivison, 57 S.W.2d 1005, 1006 (Ky. 1943) (promise to return
boat "at least as clean as it was when it was received" did not create absolute liability
when boat was burned without fault of bailee); Davis v. Lampert Agency, Inc., 291
N.Y.S.2d 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968) (promise to return "in the condition that it was
leased" merely restates bailee's ordinary obligation, but does not enlarge it); Loeb v.
Ferber, 30 A.2d 126, 127 (Pa. 1943) (term in storage agreement obliging bailee "to return
the said articles in the same condition as when received by me" held merely to restate
bailee's obligation to use due care).
68. See 9 WILLISTON, supra note 6, § 1041, at 925 n.19; George F. Himmel, Case
Note, Bailment--Effect of Special Contract on Bailee's Liability, 31 B.U. L. REV. 227
(1951); Jack Hofert, Case Note, Bailments: Extension of Bailee's Liability by Contract:
Effect of Express Promise to Return Bailed Article, 3 UCLA L. REv. 382 (1956).
69. See BROWN, supra note 4, § 11.5, at 275-76 ("[I]t has been well said that precedents
of other cases are of little value.").
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decided on its own facts. It will always be in the interests of
bailors to stress the contractual side of the bailment in contending
that the bailee has assumed a greater burden than that of reasonable care. Economic advantage motivates bailors to make this
argument because minuscule differences in contract wording may
turn out to have large economic consequences. Existing case law
allows, and even encourages, American courts to accept the argument.70 The overall result is uncertainty and even anomaly in
the cases. The inevitable casualty is the uniform standard of
negligence-based liability.
V.

"DEVIATIONS"

FROM CONTRACTUAL TERMS

The contractual understanding of bailments has also encouraged
a second type of exception to the negligence-based rule of liability
in cases where it could be alleged that the bailee had acted contrary
to a basic term of the bailment agreement. In these situations,
commonly described as either "deviations" or "departures" from
the contract of bailment, the liability of bailees for the value of
the bailed chattel becomes absolute, and lack of fault will not
absolve them. As a leading case put it, "If a bailee elects to deal
with the property entrusted to him in a way not authorized by the
bailor, he takes upon himself the risks of so doing." '7 Many
similar cases have been decided in recent years. Unlike the cases
involving promises to return goods unharmed, the deviation and

70. There are a number of cases in which strict liability was imposed on a bailee on
the basis of such contractual language relating to return of the chattel. See United States
v. Seaboard Mach. Corp., 270 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. 1959) (equipment for shipyard destroyed
by fire); Venice v. Frazier Davis Constr. Co., 87 F. Supp. 475 (D.C.Z. 1949); Kaye v.
M'Divani, 44 P.2d 371 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1935) (rug stolen from furnished residence);
Elliott v. Sheridan, Inc., 385 So. 2d 1074 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (shop equipment
seized by the government); Saf-T-Green of Atlanta, Inc. v. Lazenby Sprinkler Co., 312
S.E.2d 163 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (engine stolen from premises of bailee); Thompson Lumber
Co. v. Cozier Container Corp., 333 P.2d 1004 (Idaho 1958) (power tool not in good
condition when delivered required to be returned in sound operating condition because of
contract provision to that effect); Nimet Indus., Inc. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 419 N.E.2d 779
(Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (machinery damaged by fire set to cover up burglary); Zaidens v.
Salter, 254 N.Y.S. 602 (N.Y. City Ct. 1931) (gems stolen without negligence chargeable to
ballee); International Feed Prods., Inc. v. Alfalfa Prods., Inc., 337 N.W.2d 154 (N.D.
1983) (unexplained loss of inventory used in producing feed); Home Ins. Co. v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 97 N.E.2d 231 (Ohio Ct. App. 1949) (lease of road grader damaged by
employee); McKenzie Equip. Co. v. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 451 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. 1970)
(lessee liable for damage to air compressor by "unavoidable accident"); Kennedy v. Clark,
154 A. 577 (Vt. 1931) (milking equipment destroyed by fire); Allstar Video Inc. v. Baeder,
730 P.2d 796 (Wyo. 1986) (computer equipment lost in shipment).
71. Barrett v. Freed, 35 A.2d 180, 181 (D.C. 1943) (quoting Lilley v. Doubleday, 7
Q.B.D. 510, 511 (1881)).
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departure cases do not depend on a "careful reading" of contractual language. They do, however, demonstrate the continuing
vitality of the notion that bailments may be regarded properly as
contracts. In addition, they provide further explanation for the
elusiveness of a uniform standard of liability.
One case in particular well illustrates the way in which the above
theory has been employed to impose strict liability on bailees. This
Massachusetts decision of 195172 involved an agreement to store
household furniture. During the course of the bailment, the storage
company moved the furniture from the fifth floor of their facility
to the basement. While in the basement, the furniture was destroyed by fire, apparently without any fault on the part of the
company. In subsequent litigation it was held that because the suit
had been brought as "an action of contract to recover for the loss
of furniture," and because the company could establish neither
that the bailor had agreed to the move nor that the furniture
would also have been burned on the fifth floor, the company was
liable without regard to fault. 73 There was admittedly no evidence
presented to show that the parties had expressly made storage on
the fifth floor an essential term of'their agreement. Nor was there
anything to show that one location was more dangerous than the
other. However, it appeared that the higher location is what the
bailor had been told about at the time he brought the furniture
in, and the Massachusetts court held that a jury was entitled to
find that continued storage according to that expectation was what
had been "in the contemplation of the parties" at the time they
entered into the bailment contract. 74 Therefore, the jury found a
"deviation," and the bailee was held strictly liable.
The same reasoning has been applied in a variety of contests
over liability. In one case, a watch repairer entrusted a watch left
with him to another repairman for more expert service. 75 A New
York court held him liable without fault when the watch was
stolen from the other repairman. 76 The court found that the original
repairer had been under a contractual duty to inform the owner
that the repairs might be carried out off the premises at the time
of their original dealings. 77 He had not done so, and consequently
was held responsible for the loss, even though he would not have

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Nathan v. Tremont Storage Warehouse, Inc., 102 N.E.2d 421 (Mass. 1951).
Id. at 422.
Id. (quoting Mortimer v. Otto, 99 N.E. 189, 190 (N.Y. 1912)).
Morrison v. Bramley & Co., 481 N.Y.S.2d 569 (White Plains City Ct. 1984).
Id. at 570.

77.

Id.
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been liable had the theft occurred on his premises. 78 In another
case, a man in the state of Washington borrowed a car to take
others to a railroad station from where they were to catch a train
taking them to a funeral. 79 They missed the train at the station,
and so the man drove on to their ultimate destination. The car
was wrecked through no fault of the driver, and it was held that
this deviation, "without any further consent from [the owner] and
without his knowledge," was sufficient to allow the car's owner
to recover the full value of the wrecked automobile. 0 The question
of fault simply did not come into play. In yet another case, a
South Dakota farmer contracted for a year's possession of a
Percheron stallion to serve as a stud for his mares, agreeing to
"take, feed, and care for said stallion."'8 He used the stallion not
only as a stud, but also as part of a plough team, claiming that
this usage was "for the purpose of giving [the horse] proper and
needed exercise." '8 2 Returning from one such bout of "exercise,"
the horse died. The court brushed the farmer's excuses aside,
holding that if the jury found the farmer "had no right under his
contract to use the horse in that manner," he was liable "regardless
of any degree of care or diligence." 3 In each of the above cases,
failure to live up to a term of the bailment agreement was the
reason each court gave for holding a bailee liable without fault.
A judge in another such case summarized the principle, stating
that "[a]ll [the defendant's] trouble arises from failure to carry
'' 4
out his contract. 9

78. Id.; see also Greyvan Lines, Inc. v. Nesmith, 50 A.2d 434 (D.C. 1946); Rourke
v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 167 N.E. 231 (Mass. 1929); Miller v. Greyvan Lines, Inc.,
130 N.Y.S.2d 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954), aff'd, 126 N.E.2d 183 (N.Y. 1955); Pennington
v. Styron, 153 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. 1967); Johnson v. Steinhauer, 70 N.E.2d 483 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1946); Ricks v. Smith, 204 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). Contra Barnett-Miron
Enters., Inc. v. Roneal Martin, Inc., 742 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. Civ. App. 1987).
79. Burnett v. Edward J. Dunnigan, Inc., 4 P.2d 829 (Wash. 1931).
80. Id. at 830; see also Sperisen v. Heynemann, 308 P.2d 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957);
Maynard v. James, 146 A. 614 (Conn. 1929); Williams v. Buckler, 264 S.W.2d 279 (Ky.
1954); Truck Leasing Corp. v. Esquire Laundry & Dry Cleaning Co., 252 S.W.2d 108 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1952).
81. Fryer v. Cooper, 220 N.W. 486, 487 (S.D. 1928).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 488.
84. Barrett v. Freed, 35 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C. 1943); see also Cross County Leasing
Corp. v. Ryder Truck Rental Inc., 302 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Va. 1969), aff'd, 432 F.2d
781 (4th Cir. 1970); Constantian v. Mercedes-Benz Co., 55 P.2d 841 (Cal. 1936); Williams
v. Buckler, 264 S.W.2d 279 (Ky. 1954); Tessmar v. Grosner, 128 A.2d 467 (N.J. 1957);
Ogden v. Transcontinental Airport, 177 N.E. 536 (Ohio Ct. App. 1931); Seale v. White,
217 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Lake Air, Inc. v. Duffy, 256 P.2d 301 (Wash.
1953).
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The informality of the contractual terms that are deemed determinative is a particularly striking feature in many of the "deviation" cases. Without any showing of an express, written agreement
limiting the ways in which the bailed goods may be kept, triers of
fact are required (or invited) to determine the intent of the parties
at the time they entered into the bailment. For instance, if a jury
decides that "there was a meeting of minds" to the effect that
goods would be stored in a particular place because of the address
recorded on a storage receipt, 5 or even because the bailee had
come to the bailor in response to the latter's classified advertisement listing a particular address, 6 a judgment may follow that the
bailee has become liable without fault if the goods are later stolen
from or damaged at a different location. In other words, there
need be no exact stipulation of location.
There are limits, of course. For a "deviation" to give rise to
strict liability, it must have been a material breach of the bailment
contract. Not every slight variation will suffice. In addition, the
bailor must show that the loss would not have occurred but for
the deviation, and if the bailor knows of a settled custom that
allows bailees to send the goods to a third party for repair or
safekeeping, then no liability attaches. 7 Several recent decisions
have gone against bailors on the factual question of whether the
bailment contract contemplated the exact place and manner of
keeping the goods alleged in the bailor's complaint.8" And, of
course, if the bailor actually agreed to the deviation, no liability
will attach for purely accidental loss. 9 The doctrine of "deviation"
has not been simply an engine for imposing strict liability on
nonnegligent bailees. Overall, however, there are enough cases
applying the doctrine in that fashion to show that, in this context,
American law remains far from having reached a uniform standard
of reasonable care in determining the liability of bailees. Thus,
the result in cases where "deviation" could possibly be an issue
remains unpredictable.
Am9ng the most important of the "deviation" cases, at least in
monetary consequence, have been those involving the liability of
an employer for the acts of its employees. The effect of treating
the bailment as a contract in these cases is striking. Ordinarily an
85.
86.
87.
88.

See Fotos
See Ricks
See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,

v. Firemen's Ins.* Co., 533 A.2d 1264, 1268 (D.C. 1987).
v. Smith, 204 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
Wood v. Frank Graham Co., 86 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955).
Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Brock & Co., 118 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App.

1941); Howell v. Luttrell, 190 S.E. 813 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937); Smith v. McRary, 295 S.E.2d
444 (N.C. 1982).
89. See Blackford v. Folkerth, 114 N.E.2d 917 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
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employer is not liable for the acts of its employees when they have
acted beyond the scope of their employment. 9° However, as one
Pennsylvania court stated the exception, "such [a] doctrine does
not apply to the contractual liability of a bailee to the bailor." '9
This has meant, for example, that where an owner has left his car
in a parking lot operated by the defendant corporation, and the
corporation's employee took the car for a spin, during which time
was wrecked, the corporation could be held liable for the
the car
loss. 92 Liability existed not because of respondeat superior; it was
admitted that the employee had acted beyond the scope of his
authority. 93 Rather, liability existed because the undertaking to
preserve and redeliver inherent in the bailment contract had been
violated. 94 Fault became legally irrelevant because the contractual
aspect of the bailment controlled the theory of liability.
It should be noted that several cases decided during the last
sixty years have reached the opposite result, treating employee
deviations as governed by the law of torts, thereby reaching a
result consistent with a uniform standard of reasonable care. 95
However, these decisions remain a minority. 96 Most courts have
adopted a contract theory of bailments in such cases and have
imposed liability on bailee-employers whose employees have deviated from the bailment contract.9 7 In principle, it seems quite

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
91. Metzger v. Downtown Garage Corp., 82 A.2d 507, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951)
(emphasis in original); see also Maynard v. James, 146 A. 614, 615 (Conn. 1929) ("This
duty of the defendants was contractual in its nature; it required performance .... ); Bozel
& Jacobs, Inc. v. Blackstone Terminal Garage, Inc., 75 N.W.2d 366, 371 (Neb. 1956)
("The question here is not that of a defendant's exercise of due care .... It is a question
of defendant's liability for a breach of its admitted contract."); Johnson v. Hanna, 101
N.W.2d 830, 835 (N.D. 1960) ("[T]he liability in such a case grows out of the fact that
the bailee has failed to do the thing he agreed to do, rather than, as in tort, out of the
theory that the servant is acting for the master.") (quoting 6 AM. JUR. Bailments § 224
(1950)).
92. Metzger v. Downtown Garage Corp., 82 A.2d 507, 507 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951).
93. Id. at 508.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g.,Castorina v. Rosen, 49 N.E.2d 521 (N.Y. 1943); New Amsterdam
Casualty Co. v. Greenberg, 274 N.Y.S. 854 (N.Y.City Ct. 1934).
96. See W.LISTON, supra note 6, § 1065, at 1021 n.8.
97. See Pratt v. Martin, 35 S.W.2d 1004 (Ark. 1931); Bidlake v. Shirley Hotel Co.,
292 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1956); Samuelson v. Harper's Furs, Inc., 131 A.2d 827 (Conn. 1957);
Southeastern Air Serv., Inc. v. Carter, 50 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. Ct. App. 1948); Gulf & Ship
Island R.R. v. Sutter Motor Co., 126 So. 458 (La. Ct. App. 1930); Waters v. United
States Garage, Inc., 160 A. 758 (Me. 1932); Joseph v. Mutual Garage Co., 270 S.W.2d
137 (Mo. Ct. App. 1954); Burke v. Posner, 60 N.E.2d 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); Dispeker
v. New S. Hotel Co., 373 S.W.2d 904 (Tenn. 1963).
90.
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correct to argue that it should make no difference under which
theory of bailment a suit is brought when the defendant's employee
has caused loss or damage. But in fact it often does.
VI.

CONVERSION BY BAILEES

Conversion theory has provided another source of inroads on
the uniform standard of reasonable care. In some sense, the results
of applying conversion theory follow the "deviation" cases, given
that the most extreme form of "deviation" by a bailee is undoubtedly actual conversion of the bailor's property. If a bailee converts
the bailed goods, under traditional legal principles the bailor may
maintain an action of trover to recover the full value of the goods,
and in such situations it may with justice be said that the bailee
has acted contrary to his contractual undertaking. 98 However,
although there is an inevitable overlap between suing in trover and
suing in contract, the theory underlying the two is nonetheless
quite distinct. Suing in contract requires a showing of only a
failure to preserve and redeliver; nonfeasance on the part of the
bailee is sufficient to support this cause of action. Suing in trover,
on the other hand, requires misfeasance - a positive act in
derogation of the bailor's title or possession. The action lies when
the bailee has used the goods in a way that denies the bailor's
legitimate property rights in them.
This difference in theory has important consequences in litigation. It means, for example, that conversion can be used to impose
liability on a person to whom the original bailee has delivered the
goods even though no contract action would lie against those same
persons. 99 Similarly, in trover the bailor may recover the full value
of the goods and also punitive damages under appropriate circumstances100 The latter would not be available if the action were
brought on the contract. 10 1 However, in one significant respect the
two are similar: the bailee's liability under both theories is virtually
absolute and not defined by a standard of reasonable care. Neither
mistake, good faith, nor lack of fault will absolve a bailee who

98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A (1965); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.,
THE LAW OF TORTS § 2.7 (2d ed. 1986).
99. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 15, at 93-94 (5th
ed. 1984).
100. See, e.g., Dickens v. DeBolt, 602 P.2d 246, 252 (Or. 1979) (police officer held
subject to punitive damages for eating a fisherman's sturgeon after seizing it as "evidence"
in an unrelated case).
101. See generally 1 HARPER ET AL., supra note 98, § 2.36, at 238 (describing this
"special rule of damages" in conversion as the wellspring of its popularity and longevity).
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has converted the bailed goods, any more than it will absolve the
bailee who fails to perform under a contractual analysis.
Two important questions, however, remain unanswered: (1) what
acts by a bailee will amount to conversion? and (2) do these acts
represent any substantial breach of the principle that bailees are
subject to a uniform standard of reasonable care? If conversion
were interpreted to mean what the word implies to the untutored
mind - appropriation of the bailed property to the bailee's own
use - the answer to the second question would clearly be no. If
such were the case, conversion would require actually selling the
goods for the bailee's own profit, keeping them despite a demand
for redelivery, or similar acts. As a result, the theory behind
conversion would impose virtually no higher duty of care upon
bailees. Only positively wrongful acts, amounting to a repudiation
of the bailment rather than acts of simple negligence, would give
rise to liability.
However, this is not what has happened. Conversion, as students
of the subject have pointed out, 0 2 has acquired a considerably
wider meaning in practice. Certainly it has in the many bailment
cases decided since 1929 in which, under a wide variety of circumstances, this theory has been used to fasten a strict liability on
bailees. For example, many cases involving the unexplained disappearance of bailed goods have been decided under this rubric.
In one instance, a bailee to whom a mink coat had been delivered
for storage sent the coat to a third party for repair. The New
York court held that this act by the bailee itself constituted a
conversion of the coat. 03 When the coat disappeared, the court
found that the "failure to return the coat when demanded involve[d] liability regardless of negligence."'14 In a similar New
Jersey case, forty cases of Scotch whisky inexplicably disappeared
from a bailee's custody. 05 Under state law, the bailee was liable
for negligent custody only to a small extent of the good's value,
but the court held that by showing the 'disappearance, the plaintiff
had "presented a prima facie case of conversion." Accordingly,
unless the defendant could show a complete and exonerating

102. See, e.g., 2 THOMAS A. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 287 (1906)
(treating the action as an act of conversion criticized as "anomalous," "clearly untenable,"
and "an unconscious reversion to the primitive doctrine which holds the bailee absolutely
liable"). See generally William L. Prosser, The Nature of Conversion, 42 CORNELL L.Q.
168 (1957).
103. Engels v. Samuel Neuhoff Furs, Inc., 96 N.Y.S.2d 537 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950).
104. Id. at 538.
105. Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Griswold & Bateman Warehouse Co., 458 A.2d 1341
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983).
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excuse, it would be liable to the full extent of the loss. 1°6
In many cases involving the sale of bailed chattel by the bailee,
a conversion theory has been utilized to impose a higher standard
of liability than reasonable care upon bailees. Bailees are often
given the power to sell bailed goods either under state law (typically
to enforce a statutory warehouseman's lien) or under the bailment
contract itself (to remedy the nonpayment of the bailor's debt for

storage or repair). Most cases hold, however, that unless bailees
act in exact compliance with the law in making the sale, they will
be treated as converters. Good faith and the reasonableness of
their mistake will not protect them. Thus, although a Tennessee
finance company may have had a statutory right to sell an automobile when the buyers had not kept up their payments, the
company would be treated as a simple converter if that power was

exercised "without having regained possession thereof as contemplated by section 7287 of the Code."' 7 It will not furnish a bailee
an effective excuse to argue that they have operated under a

mistake of law, 0 8 or committed (at most) a technical failure in
notifying the bailor of the intended sale,' °9 or even subsequently
repurchased the item sold and offered it back to the bailor." 0 In
the eyes of bailment law, they will have committed an act of

106. Id. at 1344; see also American Express Field Warehousing Corp. v. First Nat'l
Bank, 346 S.W.2d 518 (Ark. 1961); Borg & Powers Furniture Co. v. Reiling, 7 N.W.2d
310 (Minn. 1942); Leavy v. Games Management Serv., 431 N.Y.S.2d 658 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1980).
107. Breeden v. Elliott Bros., 118 S.W.2d 219, 220 (Tenn. 1938); see Richard Kelley
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Williams, 343 So. 2d 776 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Kearns v. McNeill
Bros. Moving & Storage Co., 509 A.2d 1132 (D.C. 1986); Suddath Moving & Storage Co.
v. Roure, 276 So. 2d 549 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); Hughes v. Accredited Movers Inc.,
461 A.2d 1203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983); Poole v. Christian, 411 N.E.2d 513
(Hamilton County, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1980); Flores v. Didear Van & Storage Co., 489 S.W.2d
406 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
108. See, e.g., Newhart v. Pierce, 62 Cal. Rptr. 553, 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (bailee's
option to purchase cattle invalid for lack of consideration; the court concluding that sale
by bailee was conversion since "[a] taking clouded by mistake is no less a wrongful
taking").
109. See, e.g., Page v. Allison, 47 P.2d 134 (Okla. 1935). In Page, certain household
goods were deposited with a warehouseman. The warehouseman subsequently sold the
goods to enforce a lien. Although the depositor of the goods verbally notified the
warehouseman of his change of address, the warehouseman instead sent notice of the sale
through registered letter addressed to the last recorded address of the depositor. The court
held that the depositor's verbal notice of his change of address was valid, and that the
warehouseman, therefore, failed to comply with the applicable statutory notice requirement.
110. See, e.g.,'Williams v. O'Neal Ford, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1984) (punitive
damages awarded where bailor refused to accept proffered car in lieu of full payment of
its value).
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conversion, and from that act will follow absolute liability for the
full value of the goods.
Misuse of the bailed item also has frequently produced a judicial
finding of conversion by bailees and consequently of absolute
liability. For example, in a 1983 New Mexico case, the lessee of
an airplane used it to transport marijuana, acting contrary to an
agreement that the plane would not be used in violation of the
law."' After the marijuana had been unloaded, the pilot took off
and crashed. When sued for the value of the plane, the lessee
sought to avoid liability by establishing that he was in no way at
fault for the crash, but that mechanical failure had been the true
and proximate cause. However, the court brushed this argument
aside, holding that the "unauthorized and injurious use" of the
plane was itself an act of conversion, rendering the lessee liable
2
for all losses that had occurred, no matter whose fault they were."1
The scope of such "misuse" as a source of conversion turns
out to be quite large in the case law. In one decision, a dealer
who had sold the plaintiff an automobile recalled it to repair a
defect." 3 The plaintiff, who was then delinquent in his payments,
brought the car in for repair. Instead of doing the repairs, however,
the dealer notified the finance company, which promptly repossessed the car. It was subsequently held that these actions of the
dealer constituted not just a dirty trick, but an act of tortious
conversion, rendering the dealer liable for the full value of the
purchaser's interest in the car, plus punitive damages."14 In another
such illustrative case, a bus was left with the defendant for purposes
of storage." 5 The defendant used the bus to transport passengers,
admittedly acting contrary to the agreement. He claimed, however,

Ill. Gelder v. Puritan Ins. Co., 668 P.2d 1117 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
112. Id. at 1118; see also Swish Mfg. Southeast v. Manhattan Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
675 F.2d 1218, 1219 (lth Cir. 1982) (holding that "misuse, that is, use beyond that which
the owner consented to, may give rise to conversion" under both common law and Georgia
law); E.J. Caron Enters. v. State Operating Co., 179 A. 665, 666 (N.H. 1935) (moving
equipment from one movie theater to another constituted conversion, the judge concluding
that, "[ilt is a wrongdoer who has sought to get illegitimate gains by converting the rights
of the plaintiff") (the case is noted and its reasoning criticized in Daniel J. Baugrund,
Note, Conversion: Bailee's Unauthorized Use of Bailed Chattel, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 112
(1935)); Seale v. White, 217 S.W.2d 38, 39 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (a plane, left for sale
and flown without bailor's consent, crashed during flight; liability for full value of the
plane held established "irrespective of negligence").
113. Monarch Buick Co. v. Kennedy, 209 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 1965).
114. Id.; see also Williams v. O'Neal Ford, Inc., 668 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1984); Montano
v. Land Title Guarantee Co., 778 P.2d 328 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Presley v. Cooper, 284
S.W.2d 138 (Tex. 1955); Vermont Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 153 A. 199 (Vt. 1931).
115. Miller v. Uhi, 174 N.E. 591 (Ohio Ct. App. 1930).
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that he had not materially harmed the bus and had been perfectly
willing to return it before trial. The court nonetheless held that
use of the bus "to a greater extent than authorized" was a
conversion, and that the defendant was liable as a matter of law
for the full value of the bus." 6 Misuse of the property by the
bailee, therefore, allowed the bailor the choice of recovering the
chattel itself or seeking its full value in an action for conversion.
The bailees in these situations did not deny or impeach the title
of the bailor, nor did they withhold the goods from the bailor's
possession after a lawful demand for their return. Rather, they
merely used the property for their own purposes. Traditional
bailment law holds, however, that it is for the bailor to say how
the property shall be used, and any act by the bailee which
presumes to exceed that purpose constitutes an exercise of dominion inconsistent with the rights of the bailor.' 7 Conversion requires
no more. As a result, bailors may elect either to recover the item
(enforcing their property rights as bailor) or sue for the full value
of the item in an action for conversion (enforcing their rights as
victim of an intentional tort). The fact that the bailee has acted
in good faith, or even reasonably under the circumstances, will
provide no legal defense. In substance, though not in theory, such
cases often seem indistinguishable from the bailment cases involving "deviation" that are treated as breaches of contract. Either
theory (or both) can be used to impose an insurer's liability on
bailees. This is what has in fact happened in many of the cases
decided since 1929.
There have been many difficult cases decided against bailees
under a conversion theory. In these cases, the bailee's conduct
might easily have been evaluated under a negligence standard, and
the result might well have been different had the bailee's liability
been defined by a uniform standard of reasonable care. In one
such case from the state of Washington, an employee left his

116. Id. at 592; see also Strother Ford, Inc. v. Bullock, 237 S.E.2d 208 (Ga. Ct. App.
1977).
117. See Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Higben Co., 76 N.E.2d 404, 407 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1947); see also Winkler v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 168 A.2d 418, 421
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1961) (defendant gave wire band possibly relevant in a tort
action to another insurance company; held that this "disposition of the wire without
authority would constitute a breach of the bailment agreement and a conversion"); Procter
& Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Lawrence Am. Field Warehousing Corp., 266 N.Y.S.2d 785, 799
(N.Y. App. Div. 1965) ("unauthorized transfer of bailed property, for whatever purpose
even for a temporary period, is a conversion"); Presley v. Cooper, 284 S.W.2d 138, 14041 (Tex. 1955) (sale of two mares to reduce bailor's debt held to be "in direct violation
of the express terms of the contract of bailment ... and the intent to convert will be
conclusively presumed").
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luggage in his employer's office before flying to Alaska." 8 It was
not clear which party had been the more careless, but the bags
were sent to the wrong destination and one was eventually lost.
When the employee sued for the value of the lost bag and its
contents, the court avoided the question of negligence entirely,
holding instead that the employer was liable for the value of the
bag and its contents "on the theory that the conduct of [the
employer] amounted to a conversion."" 9 In a conceptually similar
case from South Carolina, a car that had been left in the custody
of a dealer for repair suffered interior damage from being left
outside. 20 The court held the dealer liable for the entire value of
the car as well as for punitive damages because of the parties'
original agreement that contemplated storage for just a few weeks.2
In fact, the defendant had kept the car for a few months.' '
According to the court, the defendant's conduct "may not constitute a conversion of the plaintiff's property in the completely
of the law, it amounted to an
literal sense" but, in contemplation
22
act of conversion all the same.
These cases, and others like them, illustrate the potential consequences inherent in analyzing a bailee's conduct in terms of the
law of conversion. 23 If a bailee's conduct can be brought within
the compass of conversion theory, bailors will gain the advantage
of a more reliable theory of liability and a larger measure of
recovery. Liability will be strict, and the necessity of finding a
specific act of negligence or the possibility of dilution by comparative fault will be eliminated. Difficult questions of causation will
be avoided entirely because bailees will be liable even when there
has been a supervening proximate cause of the loss. As we shall
see, conversion theory will often also make an end run around

118. Walling v. S. Birch & Sons Constr. Co., 213 P.2d 478 (Wash. 1950).
119. Id.at 480.
120. Harris v. Burnside, 199 S.E.2d 65 (S.C. 1973).
121. Id.at 67.
122. Id. at 68.
123. See Chatterton v. Boone, 185 P.2d 610, 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947) (mistake about
whether building in which fire had occurred could safely be entered makes bailee liable for
value of household goods because "mere good faith of the bailee in refusing to deliver the
goods to the owner, upon demand, is no defense to the action of trover"); Baena Bros.,
Inc. v. Welge, 207 A.2d 749, 751 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1964) (defendant, entrusted with sofa
for "slimming" of the arms and reupholstery, held liable for full value of sofa when he
"slimmed" the arms to a greater extent than contemplated "thereby altering the style of
the furniture from colonial to modern"); Star Fruit Co. v. Eagle Lake Growers, Inc., 33
So. 2d 858 (Fla. 1948) (bailee, who accepted tangerines for grading, packing and shipping,
but dumped them after an embargo rendered them unfit for shipping, held liable for
conversion).
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contractual terms limiting the bailee's liability.'24 It is often said,
and correctly, that not every negligent act on the part of bailees
constitutes an act of conversion. But there is an overlap between
acts constituting negligence and those legally amounting to conversion. Where that overlap exists, American courts have often
used the latter theory in ways that limit the success of the uniform
standard of reasonable care.
VII.

MISDELIVERY BY THE BAILEE

Misdelivery is the one exception to the uniform standard of
reasonable care customarily mentioned in casebooks and hornbooks. Occasionally, the mention is coupled with the suggestion
that the exception, because it constitutes an anomaly in the law,
ought to be eliminated in favor of a uniform standard of reasonable
care. 25 The question is not whether this would be a good idea.
Rather, the question here is how misdelivery theory has been used
in the cases decided by American courts during the past sixty
years, and whether the theory retains enough vitality to present a
serious obstacle to the achievement of a uniform rule of negligencebased liability. It turns out that it does. The misdelivery exception
is far from dead.
There have, it is true, been cases in which misdelivery has been
treated under the rubric of negligence. In them, a bailee's liability
for delivering bailed goods to someone other than the owner has
been judged by a standard of ordinary care; when the bailee acted
reasonably, no liability was attached.' 26 However, the number of
such cases has been small, and none seems to have rejected the
misdelivery exception outright. Indeed, most have not directly
confronted the question of what the standard for a bailee's liability
should be. Rather, they have simply assumed that the case involved
a negligence standard. The suggestion that the misdelivery exception should be eliminated from the law of bailments as a matter

124. See infra pp. 35-36 and note 162.
125. See supra notes 4-5, 9 and accompanying text.
126. See Tremaroli v. Delta Airlines, 458 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1983)
(liability for baggage that disappeared during airport security check discussed largely in
terms of negligence); Laurens v. Jenny's, Inc., 66 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945) (where
delivery was made to United Parcel Service contrary to bailor's instructions, liability imposed
only for negligence and, therefore, limited to a stated amount by agreement of the parties);
Maitlen v. Hazen, 113 P.2d 1008, 1013 (Wash. 1941) ("The liability of respondents, if
any, is a tort liability, and they are liable only in the event they failed to use slight care,
or at most such care as a reasonably prudent person would have used, under all the

circumstances.").
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of legal policy seems, therefore, not to have penetrated very far
into the case law.
When there has been express consideration of bailment theory
in such cases, misdelivery frequently has been treated under either
(or both) of the two theories just discussed. That is, judges have
described misdelivery either as "itself an act of conversion,'1 27 or
as "a departure from the terms of the bailment contract,"'' 21 thus
rendering the bailee's liability virtually absolute. The "classic"
difficult cases of misdelivery have involved honest and innocent
mistakes by bailees. Usually, losses have been caused by an imposter who secured delivery by forging a claim check,' 29 or by
falsely assuming the identity of the bailor's employee. 30 Occasionally, bailees have been deceived about the identity of the true
owner of the goods when the goods were originally received,", or
when delivery was made to a third party through accident or
dishonesty on the part of a stranger to the bailment. 3 2 In the cases
decided during the past sixty years, American courts have often
held that "a delivery to an unauthorized person is as much a
conversion as would be a sale of the property."' 3 The exercise of
14
due care has constituted no defense even for a gratuitous bailee.

127. Hall v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 439, 443 (1867) ("A
misdelivery of property by any bailee to a person unauthorized by the true owner is of
itself a conversion, rendering the bailee liable in trover, without regard to the question of
due care or degree of negligence."); see also Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Wallace, 271 So. 2d
505, 510 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973) ("[C]onversion can be accomplished where there is a
wrongful delivery of personal property by a bailee resulting in its loss to the true owner.").
128. Potomac Ins. Co. v. Nickson, 231 P. 445, 447 (Utah 1924). The court stated that,
"[in a case like the one at bar, all that the bailor is required to show is that the bailee
has breached his contract by delivering the subject of the bailment to another without the
consent of the bailor." Id. at 448. See also Jacobson v. Belplaza Corp., 80 F. Supp. 917,
919 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) ("Wrongful delivery was a breach of its contract.").
129. Central Meat Mkt. v. Longwell's Transfer, Inc., 62 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1933).
130. Baer v. Slater, 158 N.E. 328 (Mass. 1927) (bailee delivered bailed goods to imposter
wearing the cap, badge, and shirt of company to which ballor had directed bailee to
deliver); see also Fremont Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Collateral Control Corp., 724 F.2d
1410 (8th Cir. 1983); David Crystal, Inc. v. Cunard Steam-Ship Co., 339 F.2d 295 (2d Cir.
1964); Motors Ins. Corp. v. Union Mkt. Garage, 207 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948);
Turner v. Scobey Moving & Storage Co., 515 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. 1974).
131. Fisher v. Pickwick Hotel, Inc., 108 P.2d 1001 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1940)
(bailee delivered bailed goods to person who had driven automobile into hotel's lot, but
did not require production of the claim check, which was in possession of the car's true
owner).
132. E.g., Byer v. Canadian Bank of Commerce, 65 P.2d 67 (Cal. 1937).
133. Central Meat Mkt., 62 S.W.2d at 89.
134. Id. at 89-90; see also S/M Indus., Inc., v. Hapag-Lloyd A.G., 586 So. 2d 876,
883 (Ala. 1991) ("In such a case neither a sincere or apparently well-founded belief that
the delivery to an unauthorized person was right nor the exercise of any degree of care
constitutes a defense even to a gratuitous ballee.").
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Cases that actually extend the misdelivery exception are even
more troubling to the view that strict liability for misdelivery is
anomalous. These cases have broadened the definition of misdelivery to encompass only roughly analogous conduct and have
thereby moved further away from a uniform standard of negligence-based liability. For example, in a 1963 Tennessee case, a
guest left her car in the hotel's parking lot at the time she
registered.' 35 A bell boy who had assisted her when she arrived
returned to the lot after going off duty, took the car and wrecked
it. In litigation that first attracted the attention and then the
intervention of the Tennessee Hotel Association, the supreme court
held that the defendant hotel had committed "an act quite analogous to misdelivery" by permitting its bell boy to have access to
the car. 13 6 Therefore, the hotel was held liable for the full value
of the automobile.'7 The court stated explicitly that, in analyzing
a bailee's conduct, "the law will not inquire whether it did so in
good faith or through negligence or otherwise."' 38 Such cases show
that the rule of absolute liability for misdelivery lives, and indeed
may actually be growing stronger in the recent decisional law. 3 9
This unhappy conclusion is likely a correct one overall, but a
survey of the cases also suggests .that, in two particular respects,
the law of bailment and misdelivery may actually have moved
slightly closer to a negligence standard of liability. First, as noted

135. Dispeker v. New S. Hotel Co., 373 S.W.2d 904, 906 (Tenn. 1963); see also
Shepherd Fleets, Inc. v. Opryland U.S.A., Inc., 759 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1988); Scruggs v. Dennis, 440 S.W.2d 20, 22-23 (Tenn. 1969).
136. 373 S.W.2d at 910.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Wheelock Bros., Inc. v. Bankers' Warehouse Co., 171 P.2d 405, 408 (Colo.
1946) (bailee "bound, at his peril in case he delivers the property to one other than the
bailor"); Terminal Transp. Co. v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 211 S.E.2d 788 (Ga. Ct. App.
1974) (liability imposed on carrier for storing goods with a third party after the party to
whom they were to be delivered refused to pay for them); Sullivan & O'Brien, Inc. v.
Kennedy, 25 N.E.2d 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1940) (delivery to father who paid balance due
for repair of son's car renders bailee liable for conversion without regard to fault or
wrongful intent); Lipman v. Petersen, 575 P.2d 19 (Kan. 1978) (holding release of wrenches
to former owner without proper authorization to constitute act of conversion); Breckinridge
County v. Gannaway, 47 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Ky. 1932) (county officer who deposited funds
in bank instead of turning them over to county treasurer, "thereby assumed all the risk
resultant from such departure from his duty as imposed by the statute"); D.A. Schulte,
Inc. v. North Terminal Garage Co., 197 N.E. 16, 18 (Mass. 1935) (truck was stored in
defendant's garage and removed by unknown persons while defendant's employees watched
"renders the defendant liable for a misdelivery of the truck"); Dolezal v. Cleveland, Canton
& Columbus Motor Freight Co., 2 Ohio Op. 423, 427 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1935) (delivery
to authorized agent who refused to pay cash-on-delivery charges treated as misdelivery).
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above, in many cases judges have treated misdelivery either as one
form of negligence or as closely associated with it, but without
giving any real consideration to the underlying legal theory. Second, in cases in which there has been a dispute over the ownership
of bailed goods, nonnegligent bailees have sometimes escaped
liability even though they had delivered those goods to the person
who later turned out not to be the true owner. In both instances,
however, courts have failed to expressly recognize that they were
departing from a misdelivery exception. For those who look for
conceptual coherence in the law, the results in this area have been
far from satisfactory.
The first of these results is readily apparent to anyone reading
a significant number of bailment cases. One notices quickly how
often misdelivery is factually linked with negligence. For example,
in a 1972 Texas case, a restaurant patron left behind her pocketbook, which was subsequently turned over to the management by
a busboy.'40 But when the patron returned to claim it the next
day, her pocketbook was gone; it had been handed over to a
stranger. In subsequent litigation, the patron alleged that the
management's actions amounted to negligent delivery and asserted
that the restaurant owner was consequently liable for the value of
the pocketbook and its contents.'14 The court agreed. Restating
the first result, both the parties and the courts treat misdelivery
as being presumptively negligent; misdelivery is itself the act of
negligence. 42 In some of the cases, it appears that both misdelivery
and negligence have been present, 43 such that liability is established
no matter what the underlying theory may be. However, decisions
do not always make their rationales clear. Indeed, some seem
almost purposefully to paper over the distinction between misdelivery and negligence.'" Of course, judges are not obliged to

140. Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas, 488 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
141. Id.at 153.
142. Id. (misdelivery was negligence); see also Saddler v. National Bank, 85 N.E.2d
733 (Ill. 1949) (misdelivery creates presumption of negligence); Smith v. Crickmore, 39
N.Y.S.2d 261, 262 (N.Y. City Ct. 1942) (presumption of "misdelivery or wrongful disposal
which constitutes gross negligence"); Rensch v. Riddle's Diamonds, 393 N.W.2d 269, 273
(S.D. 1986) (rejecting the possibility of "innocent misdelivery" as mitigating factor).
143. E.g., Jacobson v. Richards & Hassen Enters., Inc., 172 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1949)
(both rationales employed); Capezzaro v. Winfrey, 379 A.2d 493 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1977) (release by police of money to robbery suspect who was declared incompetent
to stand trial treated as both negligence and misdelivery); Clark v. Tabers, 54 S.W.2d 262
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) (delivery to nonemployee in plaintiff's store found to be both
misdelivery and negligence).
144. See, e.g., Gebert v. Yank, 218 Cal. Rptr. 585 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (inconsistencies
between misdelivery and negligence theories apparently ignored); Zayenda v. Spain & Spain,
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choose. No one requires them to satisfy the desires for conceptual
clarity of the writers of law review articles. When judges are
themselves unclear, uncertain, or uncaring, those writers can then
only point this out, recognizing the conceptual ambiguities and the
possibilities for further litigation that inevitably follow.
The second area of movement towards a negligence standard
for misdelivery has been in the difficult situation created by
disputes over the bailor's ultimate title to the goods. Bailees are
faced with more than a conceptual dilemma here: to whom should
they deliver the bailed goods - the original bailor or the claimant
with paramount title? According to traditional law, when a third
party asserts a claim to the goods and communicates this to the
bailee, the bailee will be liable to this party in conversion for
redelivering the goods to the original bailor if it turns out that the
claim is well founded. 145 On the other hand, if the bailee makes
delivery to this third party instead and it later turns out that the
original bailor is in fact the true owner, the bailee will be liable
to the bailor in conversion. In choosing to whom to make their
delivery, bailees act at their peril.
Over the past sixty years, no decision has explicitly adopted a
negligence standard when fixing the liability of misdelivering bailees
in these circumstances, but a few have come close. Courts have
held that unless bailees have good and full notice of a claim of
paramount title, their delivery of the goods back to the original
bailor will be excused. 1"1 Other courts have also excused bailees if
they refuse to deliver the goods to anyone at all until the title has
been made clear to them. 47 In theory, bailees are liable in conversion if they refuse to return the goods to the owner. When,
however, there is reasonable doubt as to who the true owner
actually is, bailees have been excused if they have withheld the
goods. To this extent, the case law over the past sixty years has
edged a little closer to a uniform standard of reasonable care in
misdelivery cases.

Ltd., 109 N.Y.S.2d 87, 91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) ("There was a departure from the terms
of the bailment, a misdelivery, brought about by the bailee's negligence."); Trinity Trucking
Corp. v. Slesinger, 49 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (liability based upon "negligence
of the defendants in the misdelivery of the truck and contents to an unauthorized person").
145. See BROWN, supra note 4, § 11.7, at 285.
146. See, e.g., Ardisco Fin. Corp. v. de Margoulies, 250 N.Y.S.2d 77, 81 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1964) (stressing that any other rule would lead to "serious practical difficulties in the
business world and interfere unnecessarily with normal commercial intercourse").
147. See, e.g., Hildegarde, Inc. v. Wright, 70 N.W.2d 257, 260 (Minn. 1955) ("But
where the refusal is qualified, and such qualification upon delivery has a reasonable
purpose, the bailee is not a converter.").
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It must be admitted, however, that these two areas do not
represent a terribly large inroad in the traditional rule. Neither
area is numerically large enough to eclipse the traditional rule that
absolute liability ensues when a bailee delivers the goods to someone other than the bailor. Absolute liability for misdelivery, therefore, may seem to be a conceptual anomaly. But it remains the
law applied in most of the American cases.
VIII.

LIMITATIONS ON THE LIABILITY OF BAILEES

Bailees, particularly professional bailees, often attempt to limit
the scope of their liability by inserting terms into bailment agreements that either exclude liability altogether or limit it to a fixed
(and usually low) dollar amount. In addition, they lobby legislatures for the adoption of statutes limiting their potential liability
- statutes which they later invoke. Disputes arising from these
attempted limitations have created one of the liveliest, or at least
the most crowded, areas of litigation involving bailees' liability
that has existed during the past sixty years. This area of litigation
most likely ranks second in volume only to litigation involving the
allocation of the burden of proof. The questions here involve
whether the theory of bailment adopted in the cases has played a
significant role in deciding these cases, and to what extent the
adopted theories have conflicted with the uniform standard of
reasonable care.
There is of course no necessary incompatibility between any
conception of bailment and limiting the extent of a bailee's liability
for negligence. Within some limits, parties can contract freely
regarding the extent of their tort liability to each other. Therefore,
the results in much of the litigation concerning limitations on
liability would have been the same regardless of the bailment
theory adopted. However, an examination of the cases reveals that
courts have used each of the theories of bailment liability previously
discussed to fasten strict liability upon bailees. These courts have
dealt with limitations of liability in ways that would not have been
possible under ordinary negligence law. This too has limited the
success of a uniform standard of reasonable care in bailment cases.
As a preliminary matter, the reluctance of courts to enforce
terms limiting liability for negligence is universally acknowledged
and deserves mention., The strength of that reluctance is the most
salient and obvious lesson to be drawn from the case law, and
48
may be a motivating factor in all of the cases described below.

148.

See, e.g., Dresser Indus. v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 560 P.2d 393, 396 (Alaska
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There are numerous reasons given for refusing to enforce limitations on liability. Some American courts have imposed liability
despite the existence of exculpatory contractual provisions by finding that the term was not sufficiently brought to the attention of
the bailors and therefore was not part of the actual bailment
contract.' 49 Others have reached the same result simply by reading
the terms strictly against the bailees who drafted them. 50 In
addition, some courts have treated the document embodying the
bailor's disclaimer simply as a form of identification, not as a
contract, thereby effectively disregarding the exculpatory provisions.' Moreover, others have invoked a public policy rationale
to fasten liability upon negligent bailees, holding the clauses limiting their liability legally invalid." 2 Finally, still others have avoided
the effect of these clauses on grounds that frankly seem incoher53
ent. 1
Most American courts, however, will enforce such limitations
on liability unless the limitations are wholly unreasonable. 54 Particularly when bailees specify a dollar limit on their liability and
offer bailors the chance to secure a higher valuation on the bailed
goods by paying a premium, bailees stand a fair chance of avoiding
liability for the full value of the goods if the goods are lost or
damaged. Indeed, bailees may be better off in the end by setting
a reasonable fixed liability than by attempting to exclude responsibility altogether. 5 5 The question here, however, is whether the
underlying theory of bailment adopted in the case law has made
any difference in jurisdictions where such limitations would otherwise be enforceable. An examination of the cases shows that it
has.
First, a contractual understanding of bailments has been used
to invalidate otherwise valid limitations on liability in cases in

1977) (describing exculpatory clauses as terms "the law at least discourages when it does
not positively forbid" (quoting Gulf Compress Co. v. Harrington, 119 S.W. 249, 250 (Ark.
1909))); see also Bailor Beware, supra note 12, at 138-55. For an instructive historical
treatment of the subject, see Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Common-Law Background of
Nineteenth Century Tort Law, 51 OHIo ST. L.J. 1127, 1148-57 (1990).
149. E.g., Lerner v. Brettschneider, 598 P.2d 515, 519 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979).
150. E.g., Brewer v. State, 31 111. Ct. Cl. 104, 109 (1975).
151. E.g., Agricultural Ins. Co. v. Constantine, 58 N.E.2d 658, 661-62 (Ohio 1944).
152. E.g., Gramore Stores, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 402 N.Y.S.2d 326, 328 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978).
153. E.g., Automobile Ins. Co. v. Harry Trencher Furs, Inc., 115 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1952).
154. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 574 (1932); 8 AM. JUR. 2D Bailments § 142
(1980).
155. See BROWN, supra note 4, § 11.5, at 273.
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which the bailees themselves have failed to live up to their undertaking. Paradoxically, contract theory has also been used to exclude
enforcement of the terms of the contract because, when bailees
"deviate" from the terms of the original contract, it seems logically
inconsistent to some courts to permit them to invoke the same
contract as a means of escaping full liability. Thus, for example,
where a storage company moved a fur coat from one storage
location to another under circumstances in which the transfer was
contrary to the original agreement of the parties, the bailee was
not permitted to rely on the agreed valuation of $200 contained
in the original bailment agreement. Rather, the bailee was liable
for the full $7600 value of the coat. 5 6 Failure to comply with the
contract's essential terms, the court held, in effect estopped the
bailee from invoking the protection for which he had contracted.
As one judge put it, a bailee "cannot deliberately breach a provision of a contract and rely upon another provision of the contract
in an action against him for such breach."' 57
Misdelivery cases make the same point. In a 1972 Texas case, a
woman left her purse in a hotel dining room. 58 The purse was
delivered to the cashier, who mistakenly gave it to a stranger.
Texas had a statute limiting liability for misdelivery to $50, and
the hotel owners sought to shelter themselves behind this statute.
They had no luck. The court held that, because the misdelivery
was the result of the bailee's negligence, "such limiting statute is
not applicable under the circumstances of this case."1 59 The difference in theory led to a difference in result. It may be true that
a simple failure to redeliver bailed goods to the bailor will not
itself be treated as misdelivery for purposes of imposing liability
on the bailee;' 60 but when violation of the bailment contract
through "deviation" or misdelivery can be shown, attempts to
take advantage of statutes or contract terms limiting the bailee's
6
liability have generally failed.' '

156. Fotos v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 533 A.2d 1264 (D.C. 1987).
157. Barrett v. Freed, 35 A.2d 180, 182 (D.C. 1943); see also Boiseau v. Morrissette,
78 A.2d 777 (D.C. 1951); Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line, 171 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1969); Zayenda v. Spain & Spain, Ltd., 109 N.Y.S.2d 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951);
Glinsky v. Dunham & Reid, Inc., 245 N.Y.S. 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930); Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Higbee Co., 76 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947). Contra Laurens v.
Jenney's, Inc., 66 N.E.2d 777 (Ohio Ct. App. 1945).
158. Shamrock Hilton Hotel v. Caranas, 488 S.W.2d 151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
159. Id. at 153.
160. See C.A. Articulos Nacionales de Goma Gomaven v. M/V Aragua, 756 F.2d 1156,
1160 (5th Cir. 1985).
161. See Wabco Trade Co. v. S.S. Inger Skou, 482 F. Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
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In bailment cases involving attempts to limit liability, the doctrine of conversion has served much the same purpose and has
allowed American courts to reach the same result. Indeed, it has
sometimes overlapped with a contractual analysis of the problem.
The basic theory behind imposing full liability for conversion
despite attempts to limit liability is simple and convincing: bailees
who purposely destroy or wrongfully sell goods in their possession
should not be able to invoke a term in the bailment contract to
limit their liability. In such circumstances, bailees will have committed an intentional act entirely inconsistent with their undertaking
as a bailee, and it would be unjust to allow them to pay less than
the full value of the goods in consequence. Indeed, to allow
anything less would tempt bailees to convert the goods whenever
they had been undervalued in the original bailment contract. 6 2
However, the cases invoking conversion theory to exclude limitations on liability have not been restricted to these situations.
Rather, they have extended the liability of bailees where no purposeful conversion could be shown and where no evidence of
actual repudiation of the bailment could be said to exist under
any fair recital of the facts. The most difficult cases have been
those in which the proximate cause of the damage or disappearance
of the bailed goods was unknown. In these cases, the question has
been whether a clause limiting the bailee's liability should be
effective, and the outcome has very often seemed to turn on
whether the underlying theory of the case was framed in terms of
negligence or of conversion. Where conversion theory has been
used, the bailees' attempts to limit the extent of their liability have
failed.
The leading recent case, decided under the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) provisions regulating warehousemen, is the 1980
New York decision of I.C.C. Metals, Inc. v. Municipal Warehouse
Co.1 63 In LC.C. Metals, a trader delivered three lots of industrial
metal to the defendant warehouseman for storage. When the trader
demanded its return three years later, the metal could not be
found. The defendant argued that it must have been stolen, though
this was in fact no more than a reasonable speculation on the
defendant's part. Litigation ensued because the warehouse receipt

Information Control Corp. v. United Airlines, 140 Cal. Rptr. 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. v. Federal Express Corp. 548 N.Y.S.2d 422 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.
1989).
162. See Lipman v. Petersen, 575 P.2d 19 (Kan. 1978); Kaplan Prods. & Textiles, Inc.
v. Chelsea Fireproof Storage Warehouse, Inc., 163 N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1957);
Page v. Allison, 47 P.2d 134, 136 (Okla. 1935).
163. 409 N.E.2d 849 (N.Y. 1980).
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limited defendant's liability to $50. The defendant was quite willing
to admit negligence because, under New York law and the U.C.C.,
its liability for negligence would have been limited to the nominal
$50. The New York Court of Appeals, however, held that the
plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment and recovery to the
full extent of the loss. The court concluded that, unless the bailee
could produce "adequate evidentiary proof in admissible form to
support its suggested explanation" for the loss, the law would
conclusively presume that it had converted the metal.' 4
There has been both doubt and contention about the wisdom
of this result. The case contains a strong dissent, which argues
that the outcome should not have turned on whether the action
was brought in conversion or negligence. 65 The dissenting judge

pointed out that conversion ordinarily requires a showing of some
affirmative act on the bailee's part. No such fact was present in
the case. The dissenting judge further argued that the majority's

opinion allowed bailors to secure more protection against loss than
they had paid for.'" These are not inconsiderable arguments, and
not every case decided since LC.C. Metals has followed its lead. 67
However, several have.' Sophisticated commentators seem likewise inclined towards the case's result. 69 Whatever the merits, the
case demonstrates, as do so many of the other recent decisions on
this subject, just how far the current decisional law stands from
a consensus in favor of a negligence-based liability for bailees.
Surveying the lot, a uniform standard of reasonable care seems as
elusive as ever.
IX. CONCLUSION
This examination of the American cases decided since 1929 has
demonstrated the continued persistence of contract and conversion

164. Id. at 856.
165. Id. at 856-58. The dissenter was Judge Jasen. The vote, however, was six to one
against his position.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., International Nickel Co. v. Trammel Crow Distrib. Corp., 803 F.2d 150
(5th Cir. 1986); Refrigeration Sales Co. v. Mitchell-Jackson, Inc., 770 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.
1985); Western Mining Corp. v. Standard Terminals, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 847 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
168. E.g., National Resources Trading, Inc. v. Trans Freight Lines, 766 F.2d 65 (2d
Cir. 1985); Philipp Bros. Metal Corp. v. S.S. Rio Iguazu, 658 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981)
(applying maritime law); Joseph H. Reinfeld, Inc. v. Griswold & Wateman Warehouse
Co., 458 A.2d 1341 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); Art Masters Assocs., Ltd. v. United
Parcel Serv., 549 N.Y.S.2d 495 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); RGA Indus. Inc. v. Jomas Express
Inc., 499 N.Y.S.2d 28 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Employers Ins. v. Chemical Bank, 459
N.Y.S.2d 238 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1983).
169. See WrrrE & SUMMERS, supra note 15, § 21-3, at 145-46.
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theories of liability in bailment cases. The property-based definition
of bailments articulated by Williston and so widely approved in
the scholarly literature has not wholly supplanted the older conceptions of bailments. This examination has also illustrated the
continuing importance of contract and conversion theories in preventing implementation of a uniform standard of reasonable care
as the invariable rule of bailment liability. Only in the area of
allocating the burden of proof has substantial progress been made
towards treating all bailment cases alike. In other areas, absolute
liability often has been fastened upon bailees who have in no way
repudiated the bailment relationship. Bailees have many times been
denied the chance to prove that their conduct was reasonable.
Different understandings of the nature of bailments have made
determinative differences in the outcomes of cases.
A critical observer might say that the result in many of the cases
surveyed depended on an arbitrary choice of which bailment theory
the deciding court chose to emphasize. That observer would doubtless be struck by the wide range of options available to judges
and litigants. It may be said that the courts could have reached
the results they did without the theories of conversion and contractual undertaking, but the fact is that they have used these
theories and have done so apparently in order to oust the negligence
standard. From this observation, it appears but a short step to the
conclusion that the case law continues to be governed by "the
anachronism, confusion, and basic unfairness of traditional doc-

trine. "170
A less critical observer might respond that the evidence merely
shows that bailments continue to stand at the intersection of
property, contracts, and tort.' 7' This critic might note, as has one
perceptive foreign observer, that a bailment has always been "a
somewhat labyrinthine concept" in the law 72 and he might also
ask why things should be any different today. Perhaps resignation
in the face of a fact of legal life is called for. A few observers proponents of the status quo - might even contend that the
current situation is a sign that the law is responding to society's
needs. According to such observers, conceptual coherence may be
a theoretically desirable goal, but not one that should come ahead
of justice in result. Put another way, they might be thinking that
the variety of available theories allows courts, in the very different
sorts of cases that come before them, to reach fairer results than

170.
171.
172.

See Bailment Liability, supra note 2, at 2121 n.6.
See Bailor Beware, supra note 12, at 129-30.
R. ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 204 (990).
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would one uniform standard of liability. There may, of course,
be something to these arguments. They are impossible to disprove,
though even their proponents could scarcely deny that the lack of
uniformity in the case law encourages uncertainty regarding the
rights of bailors and bailees and consequently increases litigation.
For those of us who hope for greater uniformity and doctrinal
coherence in the law, the bailment cases decided since 1929 nonetheless furnish an instructive example of the limits and requirements
of suggestions for law reform. We must take account of the
dynamics of litigation in making these suggestions. If we do not,
the suggestions will too often fall upon stony ground. If a culprit
for the present situation is required, the accusing finger can only
be pointed at the dynamics of ordinary litigation; it has prevented
achievement of a uniform standard of bailment liability. The
undeniable existence of precedents supporting various theories of
bailment, the clear self-interest to parties in litigation of making
use of those precedents, the comparative infrequency of appellate
litigation about each of the bailment problems surveyed, the absence in each particular case of a clear perception of the need for
overall doctrinal uniformity, and the inevitable limitations in time
and knowledge among those who make the case law, taken all
together, have combined to frustrate the achievement of a uniform
standard of negligence liability.
Only on the question of how to allocate the burden of proof,
can it be said that real progress has occurred during the last sixty
years. In that area, the relative frequency of the question in
litigation, the obviousness of the anomaly in result, and the
immediate inconvenience to judges have led to a happier outcome.
In the other areas of bailment law surveyed, the limitations have
been more prominent, and without statutory amendment, they
seem very likely to be permanent. The dynamics of case law
development will doubtlessly continue to dominate the development
of this corner of our law. The full lesson of the failure of the
uniform standard of bailee liability must therefore include a frank
recognition of the importance of these dynamics. If we wish to
make changes in the law, we must show not only why they are
desirable, we must show how they will actually be achieved.

